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Abstract:	  This	  paper	  studies	  the	  relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  income	  inequality	  
in	   long-­‐	   and	   short/medium-­‐run.	   Using	   appropriate	   econometric	   techniques	   on	   both,	  
averaged	  and	  panel	  data	  for	  the	  period	  1962-­‐2006,	  we	  find	  no	  evidence	  that	  democracy	  
is	   associated	   with	   tighter	   income	   distribution.	   Our	   results	   are	   robust	   to	   different	  
specification	   techniques,	   to	  exclusion	  of	  developed	  as	  well	   as	   the	   transition	   countries.	  
We	   speculate	   that	   different	   (and	   opposing)	   transmission	   mechanisms,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
nature	  and	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  democracy	  variable	  (both	  Polity	  IV	  and	  Freedom	  House)	  
influence	   our	   results.	   Improvement	   of	   conceptualization	   and	   measurement	   of	  
democracy	  could	  shed	  further	  light	  onto	  the	  democracy-­‐inequality	  nexus.	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1 Introduction
The recent global recession has renewed the interest in studying the link
between macroeconomic vulnerability and inequality (Piketty and Saez, 2013).
The study finds that top income shares in the US have sharply rebounded
(following the initial fall of the 2008/09 recession), ultimately resulting with
worsening income inequality. In the rest of the world, the resurgence of
populist authoritarian regimes (not least in Russia and Turkey) marked by
increased redistribution (especially towards the poor and the vulnerable)
challenge the established notion that democracies are associated with more
egalitarian income distribution and call for a much better understanding of
the political regime/income inequality nexus. Whilst the number of democ-
racies in the world has been rising (Cole, 2011), it is the populist regimes
mentioned above the capture the newspapers frontlines as a panacea to im-
proving the lives of the poor and vulnerable. Against this background,
a better understanding of the link between democracy and inequality is
needed and this paper is hence an attempt to provide a further analysis in
that direction. The issue of how institutions and types of political regimes
influence the levels of inequality has received some research attention in
the last couple of decades. Democracy is the main focus of research for
Bollen and Jackman (1985), Lee (2005), Rodrik (1999) and Reuveny and Li
(2003). The majority of these works claim that democracies tend to redis-
tribute more towards the poor, consistent with the median voter model by
Meltzer and Richard (1981), with decreasing inequality as a final result. As
a counterbalance to this, there has been a strand of literature which has
claimed that redistribution in different types of political regimes is primar-
ily influenced by decisions of efficiency rather than politics (Sala-i-Martin,
1996; Benabou, 1996; Rodriguez, 2004). This group of authors tend to con-
clude that regime type cannot be considered as one of the main determi-
nants of inequality. On the other hand, the impact of institutions on in-
equality and vice versa has been the main focus of analysis for a significant
group of researchers (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Sokoloff and Enger-
man, 2000; Chong and Gradstein, 2007). Finally, some of the extant research
attempted to disentangle the impact of ideology on inequality (Gradstein et
al. 2001) and the impact of corruption on inequality and poverty (Gupta et
al. 2002). Thus, the academic quest for unearthing the political determinants
of inequality to date, has opened Pandora’s box leaving a host of impor-
tant questions unanswered, which merit further study. Likewise, efforts at
understanding the causal pathways and transmission mechanisms through
which types of regimes impact inequality over the short and long run are in
their infancy. What is clear however is that income inequality (as measured
by the Gini coefficient) is highly correlated with some of the variables which
are used to measure the quality of institutions. For example, the coefficient
of correlation between inequality (Gini coefficient) and regime type (mea-
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sured through the Freedom House Index1) is 0.4163. These simple statistics
however, reveal but a little of the intricate relationship between inequality
and regime types. Indeed, even if we assume that regimes are the principal
factor that determines the level of inequality, we are left with an incomplete
answer. Regimes are not created in a vacuum: they emerge (prosper or fal-
ter) based on a complicated interplay between a country’s historical experi-
ence and its economic and political agents. This in itself can be expected to
have a profound and, potentially, conflicting impact on the level of inequal-
ity. Starting from the premise that the issue at hand is an empirical one,
this paper analyzes the relationship between democracy and inequality in
medium/short and long run. In that respect, we do not find evidence that
democracy is associated with more equal distribution of income. Our find-
ings hold for both, long and medium/short term. This paper adds to the
existing knowledge in several important ways. First and crucially in view
of the complexities hinted at above, it employs IV regressions when esti-
mating the long term impact of democracy on inequality and system GMM
techniques when estimating the short/medium term effect. By adopting
this approach we deal with some of the recurrent problems in social science
analysis, such as unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of the regres-
sors. Second, in employing this approach, it introduces exogenous instru-
ments for democracy to the system GMM and IV estimates. Third, it analy-
ses a comprehensive set of theoretically motivated channels through which
regime types impact the level of inequality. The paper itself is organized as
follows: Section 2 presents the causal mechanisms through which democ-
racy impacts inequality. Section 3 describes the data and the basic empirical
links, while Section 4 outlines the empirical framework used in the paper.
Section 5 presents the empirical results, Section 6 offers the discussion and
Section 7 concludes.
2 CausalMechanisms of theDemocracy-inequality
Nexus
Reuveny and Li (2003) argue that policies in democracies will always
be designed so that there is more redistribution going towards the middle
and the poorer classes in the society, leading to lower levels of inequal-
ity. Indeed, a special strand of literature emerged in the early 1980s that
tried to disentangle the link between democracy and inequality (especially
through the redistributive channel) synthesized in the median voter model
by Meltzer and Richard (1981). The model rests on two fundamental as-
1 The Freedom House has developed an index of political rights and civil liberties,
whereby all countries in the world are assessed on a scale from 1 to 7 (one being per-
fectly free and democratic society, 7 being a perfectly oppressive society). For the exercise
above the simple average of the civil liberties and political rights is used.
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sumptions: (i) decisions to redistribute are based on rational choices of
utility-maximizing individuals; and (ii) all individuals are voters, which
would imply that the link between market-generated inequality and re-
distribution is higher in democracy than in non-democracy (Meltzer and
Richard, 1981). According to them, since in societies with higher inequality,
income distribution is skewed to the left, implying that average income is al-
ways higher than median income, the median voter shall always have incen-
tive to vote for higher redistribution and taxation of higher incomes. Fur-
thermore, under progressive taxation, the median voter will gain more from
redistribution than from taxation. Thus it follows that the more unequal the
society is, the more the median voter will vote for higher taxes. In other
words, in more unequal societies, the median income voter is expected to
exert pressures for more redistribution, as the benefits acquired from redis-
tribution are higher than the costs associated with higher taxation. To date,
robust empirical evidence that would support the median voter hypothesis
is lacking. Milanovic (1999) found that there is indeed more redistribution
going towards the poorer segments of the society, though not necessarily
through the median voter mechanism. He speculates that there are three
reasons for his findings: (i) level of the decisive voter, in the income distri-
bution, is much lower than the median, which apparently is contrary to the
latest findings (Bassett et al. 1999); (ii) there may be some long-term gains
from redistributive policies, which the middle class is expecting (for exam-
ple, the middle class may not be benefiting from unemployment benefits
now, but they may do so in the long run); (iii) another mechanism through
which the redistribution takes place may have to be defined. Stemming
from results of the study by Milanovic (1999), it could be argued that poorer
segments of society may not always push for higher taxation, leaving open
the possibility for less than egalitarian democracies (e.g. the Latin Amer-
ican democracies). Segura-Ubiero (2007) claims that low income groups
are likely to press governments for higher levels of social spending only
to the extent that these expenditures reach and benefit them directly. This
is why the effect of democracy tends to be negative vis-a´-vis social security
expenditures (which in Latin America are regressive) and turned positive
with respect to health and education expenditures (which tend to be more
progressive). This corroborates the findings from a number of studies that
have documented that social security spending in Latin America is based
on legal employment in the formal sector, which makes most of the lower
classes ineligible for this kind of transfers (mainly pensions). It is there-
fore not surprising that low-income groups that presumably gain political
power with democracy do not press governments to increase social security
programs that will not benefit them directly. Whether or not the poor will
push for higher taxation depends on their capacity to organize themselves
or as McKay et al. (2003) point out, this will depend on the construction
of an inclusive lower-class identity. The ability of the poor to form broad
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 4
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horizontal alliances, and to parlay these into social movements and polit-
ical parties, will be a key factor in determining whether they are able to
push through comprehensive approaches to structural problems of asset in-
equality (McKay et al. 2003). On the other hand, while the assumption that
middle classes prefer higher redistribution could be valid (Reuveny and Li,
2003), this argumentation need not always hold especially since the interests
of the lower and the middle classes do not always rest on the claims of in-
creased redistribution and since they are not always compatible. According
to Ringen (2007), the middle classes are interested in prosperity and effi-
ciency but they are also interested in helping the lower classes as poverty
threatens the established order and it is a nuisance in an otherwise well
established middle class life. Similarly, according to Rueschemeyer et al.
(1992), the primary economic interest of the middle class lies in the devel-
opment and guarantee of the institutional infrastructure of market devel-
opment - in the institutions of property and contract, in the predictability
of judicial decisions, in the functioning of markets for capital, goods, ser-
vices and labour, and in the protection against unwelcome state interven-
tion. Therefore, middle classes are not always the principal actors of higher
redistribution. They will however, in certain instances embrace the poorer
classes, especially when the poorer classes are smaller and with uneven de-
velopment and when they demand less redistribution2. This hypothesis is
supported by the works of Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) who claim that in late
developing countries, the relative size of the urban poorer class is typically
smaller because of uneven, “enclave” development, because of changes in
the overall transnational structure of production, and because of the related
stronger growth of the tertiary sector. This means that alliances across class
boundaries could possibly emerge. These types of alliances emerged in
some European countries, such as for example Switzerland, towards the
end of the nineteenth century. The middle class realized that the poor is
small and fragmented and hence it would not require much redistribution.
Hence, the middle class was more amenable to accommodate the demands
of the poorer segments while pursuing its own goals of economic develop-
ment and further economic and political power. Given the variety of often
opposing transmission mechanisms presented above, the question on the
impact of democracy on inequality becomes an empirical one and we ad-
dress it in the subsequent sections.
3 Data and Basic Empirical Links
This section describes our indicators and data for democracy and in-
come inequality as well as a set of conditioning information3. The income
2 Similar argument could be found, most recently, in a work by Acemoglu et al. (2013).
3 The following countries were included in the dataset for the analysis: Argentina, Arme-
nia, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada,
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inequality data comes from the UN WIDER dataset. It is the most compre-
hensive dataset of inequality data, which also contains data based on variety
of measures (consumption and income), levels of aggregation (urban, rural,
regional) and different characteristics of the labour force (working age, em-
ployed, unemployed). Given this problem with raw data, we decided to
use an algorithm as described by Mickiewicz and Gerry (2008) in order to
come up with inequality data based solely on income and with high quality.
Mickiewicz and Gerry (2008) first retained income-based data and elimi-
nated all data based on consumption measures as well as all data points not
based on representative coverage of the whole population. Where possible,
they preferred data emanating from studies based on the Canberra group
definition, where income includes production, barter and other non-cash
income. The income in question is disposable income, not gross income
(therefore, incorporating the impact of redistributive policies of the govern-
ment). In addition, the preferred methodology identifies households as the
appropriate sampling units, adjusted with equivalence scales. In case two
results based on a similar methodology were available, they have taken the
source that was more recent and that covered a longer time series. Finally,
a supplementary criterion used to purge the data was the quality ranking
of studies, available from the WIDER dataset, which grossly confirms the
criteria enumerated above4. In addition we have conducted a secondary
transformation of the Gini data, as described in Reuveny and Li (2003).
According to them, the usual practice is to transform a bounded variable
(such as the Gini coefficient) into an unbounded one. We transform the
bounded Gini into an unbounded variable by using the following transfor-
mation equation lGini = log(Gini/(100 − Gini)). The extant literature on
the relationship between democracy and economic growth has used several
proxies for democracy. Needless to say, the notion of democracy is fuzzy,
open to discussion and interpretation. Moreover, the process of defining
and measuring democracy still stirs passions in the intellectual world and it
is the pivotal issue in an on-going debate. Nevertheless, when defined, the
concept of democracy is usually treated as a political concept and as such it
usually revolves around the issues of political participation of the populace,
popular control and popular organization (also including the rights and lib-
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Ger-
many, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mauri-
tius, Mexico, Moldova, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Zambia.
4 We believe that this method of purging the data is much more superior that the one
suggested by Deininger and Squire (2000), who include both income and expenditure
based inequality data and adjust the data by adding 6.6 points to the expenditure based
data.
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Figure 1: Average Polity IV and Average Gini coefficient
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erties to do so). Equally conflicting is the issue of measuring democracy
with researchers usually clashing on whether democracy should be treated
as a dichotomous variable, or whether one should apply a gradient ap-
proach. Given that in this study we analyze the long and short term effects
of democracy on inequality, we apply a gradient approach towards measur-
ing democracy and use Polity IV - one of the most widely used datasets on
democracy5. Polity IV ranks the countries of the world on a spectrum rang-
ing from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed or incoherent au-
tocratic regimes ending with fully institutionalized democracies. The nature
of the regime is measured on a 21 point scale ranging from -10 (full autoc-
racy) to +10 (full democracy). Unlike the Freedom House Index that focuses
on both political right and civil liberties, Polity IV consists of six component
measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on
the executive authority and political competition. It also records changes in
the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. This more constrained
definition of democracy applied by Polity IV, according to some authors,
renders it more appropriate in applying this particular dataset in empirical
studies (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002)6.
Plotting the logarithm of the Gini coefficient against the measure of democ-
racy suggests a strong negative relationship between the two variables (Fig-
ure 1). In order to isolate the effect of communism we split the time period
in two - one from 1960 until 1989 and the second one from 1990 until 2006.
However the graph does not control for additional explanations for level of
income inequality, such as economic growth and development, for example,
and this is where we turn to the deeper analysis of the issue.
5 Although in our robustness checks we do also experiment with using Electoral Democ-
racy from Freedom House as a proxy for democracy.
6 However, we do check the robustness of our results by using alternative measures for
institutions, namely Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties index. It assigns
the countries a specific score corresponding to their level of political rights and civil lib-
erties (1 being most democratic and 7 being most authoritarian). We also transform the
Polity IV variable by adding 10 to the main score, thus arriving at a gradient measure
which ranges from 0 to 20 (0 being perfectly autocratic and 20 being perfectly demo-
cratic).
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4 Empirical Framework
To further explore the relationship between democracy and income in-
equality, we estimate the following relationship:
lGini = α + βlGini(t− 1) + γDemocracy + δX + 
In the panel data analysis we also include a lagged dependent variable as a
regressor in order to account for the persistence of inequality. This strategy
is obviously not applicable to the analysis of the long-term relationship. As
discussed above, the democracy index as per Polity IV is used as a main
independent variable in the model. While we are primarily interested in
estimating the linear relationship between the two variables, we also test
for possible non-linearities in the relationship between democracy and in-
equality. X represents a battery of control variables. We include several
variables to control for other factors that might affect inequality. Specifi-
cally, we include linear and squared term of the log of (initial) real GDP per
capita to control for a direct “Kuznets effect” of economic development on
income inequality that is independent of the occurrence of democracy. Once
controlling for initial GDP, the democracy variable captures the effect on
steady-state inequality. However, if the real data do not reflect steady-state
situations, initial GDP would capture whatever has been achieved by force
of convergence. We also control for the natural resources dependence (sum
of oil, gas and metals and ores as percent of GDP), conjecturing that reliance
on natural resources is prone to rent creation (further captured by the ruling
elites), which in turn exacerbates inequality (Auty, 1994; Boix and Garicano,
2001; Isham et al. 2003). Additionally, we include measures for industry
value added (in percent of GDP), credit to the private sector, trade open-
ness and government consumption. Kuznets (1955) suggests that income
inequality might depend on the sectoral structure of the economy. Hence,
we include a variable representing the share of value added accounted for
by industry. We expect that industry value added is negatively associated
with levels of inequality. This notion has been conjectured numerous times
in the theoretical literature and in addition many researchers have found
evidence for the negative link between the two variables. The theoretically
stipulated impact of financial sector development on inequality is ambigu-
ous. Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) argue that
the development of financial sector could allow the lower socio-economic
strata to borrow funds and invest them into human capital development
or entrepreneurial activities, which in turn would tighten the income dis-
tribution. The second strand of literature is represented by Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990), who posit an inverted U-curve relationship between the fi-
nancial sector and inequality. They examine the growth-inequality dynamic
in a model where finance affects dynastic access to higher expected return
projects. In the early stages of development, financial markets are virtually
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 8
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Table 1: Basic Descriptive Statistics
Variable Number of observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Gini coefficient 285 35.84 11.21 18.43 62.50
log of GDP per capita (in 2000 US dollars, PPP) 423 9.05 1.06 6.28 11.11
Average of Freedom House Political Rights and Civil liberties 477 2.73 1.75 1.00 7.00
Polity IV 563 4.43 6.72 -9.80 10.00
Industry Value Added (in percent of GDP) 531 32.38 9.68 4.75 62.54
Private Credits (in percent of GDP) 540 47.60 39.00 1.53 218.00
Trade Openness (in percent of GDP) 573 69.74 39.69 5.55 281.16
Natural Resources abundance (in percnet of GDP) 322 10.64 15.46 0.06 84.61
Government Expenditure (in percent of GDP) 567 15.81 5.46 4.00 39.34
Sources: WIIDER, World Development Indicators (WDI), Freedom House Index, International Financial Statistics (IFS) and US Department of Energy
non-existent and the economy grows slowly. With time, a financial super-
structure begins to form, but given the high fixed costs of joining the finan-
cial intermediaries, it is the rich who exclusively benefit from joining them.
When the economy reaches the intermediate stage of the growth cycle, sav-
ings rates and income inequality both increase. As the economy transitions
towards maturity, more and more people join the financial intermediaries,
hence increasing growth and reducing inequality. In the final stage of de-
velopment, the distribution of income across agents stabilizes, the savings
rate falls and the economy’s growth rate converges. A similar argument
is put forth by Townsend and Ueda (2006). Finally, the last strand of lit-
erature posits a positive linear link between the two variables. Rajan and
Zingales (2003), conjectured that, in the absence of well-developed institu-
tions, it may only be the rich who may benefit from the development of the
financial sector. Even when the financial sector becomes more developed,
the rich may still prevent firms from getting access to credit, and they may
still encourage the financial sector to channel funds towards the rich, further
increasing the gap between the rich and the poor. The impact of trade open-
ness is also ambiguous. While some theoretical models stipulate that factor
endowments (labour capital) would determine whether income distribution
would improve or worsen after trade opening, further complications of the
model (by dividing the labour onto low-skilled and high-skilled) do not al-
low for a clear cut theoretical prediction of the impact of trade openness
onto inequality. It is equally less clear whether more government consump-
tion will increase or decrease income inequality. For example, if redistri-
bution through the tax system is toward low-income groups, government
consumption may result in greater equality. However, it could also have
the opposite effect if rich households use their political power to exploit the
poor. Summary of the variables used in our analysis is presented in Table 1.
Table 2 gives a snapshot of the pairwise correlations between the vari-
ables used in the model.
We conduct the analysis in two ways: a pure cross-sectional analysis
using averaged data over the entire period (1962-2006), and a panel data
analysis using five-year averages. The cross-sectional analysis may capture
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/138 9
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Table 2: Basic Correlations among the Variables in the Model
Gini coefficient
Average of 
Freedom House 
Political Rights and 
Civil liberties
Polity IV
Natural Resources 
abundance (in 
percent of GDP)
log of GDP per 
capita (in 2000 
US dollars, PPP)
Industry Value 
Added (in percent 
of GDP)
Private Credits 
(in percent of 
GDP)
Trade 
Openness (in 
percent of 
GDP)
Government 
Expenditure (in 
percent of 
GDP)
Gini coefficient 1
Average of Freedom House Political Rights and Civil liberties 0.4882 1
Polity IV -0.3728 -0.8981 1
Natural Resources abundance (in percnet of GDP) 0.3266 0.3223 -0.2799 1
log of GDP per capita (in 2000 US dollars, PPP) -0.5876 -0.7182 0.5982 -0.2094 1
Industry Value Added (in percent of GDP) -0.1371 0.1397 -0.0205 0.4152 0.0844 1
Private Credits (in percent of GDP) -0.3657 -0.4875 0.4005 -0.2631 0.6256 -0.0213 1
Trade Openness (in percent of GDP) -0.1608 -0.15 0.1271 -0.1747 0.1591 0.0149 0.0761 1
Government Expenditure (in percent of GDP) -0.5277 -0.289 0.3008 -0.2299 0.379 0.1121 0.2926 0.2806 1
the long-term relationship between democracy and inequality. As argued
by Gradstain and Milanovic (2004), the democratic rule needs to be consol-
idated before any effects of democracy vis-a´-vis inequality are felt. In con-
trast, the panel analysis may examine the process of co-movement between
levels of democracy and inequality7. Following the convention of most-
cross country empirical panel studies, the panel analysis splits the sample
period 1962 to 2006 into 9 non-overlapping 5-year periods. We do this in
order to, inter alia, minimize the number of instruments used in the system-
GMM analysis. Another rationale for using 5-year averages is to compress
the dataset and make it more evenly distributed (given the gaps in the avail-
ability of Gini coefficient data). Estimating our main equation using ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) estimation might introduce bias because OLS does
not allow for the possibility of reverse causality - something that is already
suggested in the theoretical models8. Hence, we resort to using Instrumen-
tal Variable (IV) approach, adopting instruments for democracy which cor-
respond to the legal origin/colonial past of a country. The instruments rep-
resent a set of dummy variables as proposed by La Porta et al. (1999) that
identify country’s legal system/colonial heritage. There are a few reasons
for selecting this set of variables as instruments for political system. First,
there is a strong correlation between democracy indices and the set of legal
system/colonial heritage dummy variables (the correlation coefficient be-
tween Polity IV and the four different types of colonial/legal origins ranges
from 0.3 to 0.4). Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggests that certain colo-
nial heritage was conducive to development of more democratic political
systems. For instance, it has been argued that former British colonies were
better poised to develop democratic institutions than, for instance, the for-
mer French colonies. In addition, we have considered selection of a few
7 This second approach could be better in testing for possible non-linearities in the rela-
tionship between democracy and inequality.
8 See, for example, Savoia et al. (2010) for a more detailed analysis.
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additional variables as potential instruments for democracy (to be used in
the empirical analysis; see for instance Annex 1), however, our final set of
instruments also closely corresponds to the instruments most widely used
in the literature. Moreover, and in the empirical analysis, we examine the
validity of instruments using the Hansen test for over-identifying restric-
tions (and the equivalent test in the system GMM). In addition, we cou-
ple the standard test for validity of instruments with a diagnostic test pro-
posed by Stock and Yogo (2005) which helps in the identification of weak
instruments. There may be some criticism about the usage of these vari-
ables as instruments for democracy (for example Engermann and Sokoloff
(1997) argue that colonial types had direct impact on initial inequality).
However, it should be stressed that the impact of the colonial origins on
the initial inequality is contingent upon the abundance of the colonies with
natural resource (Acemoglu, 2001). Finally, Easterly (2007) finds very little
correlation between initial inequality and the type of legal/colonial origin,
which further gives evidence for the assumption that, in the long run, the
impact of the type of legal/colonial origin is mostly through the institu-
tional/political system. Vis-a´-vis the panel data analysis, a first question
that arises is whether the model should be estimated using random or fixed
effects or whether some more sophisticated econometric technique should
be used. Given the problems of endogeneity, omitted variable and reverse
causality (all hinted at above), system GMM is a good candidate to be used
as an alternative to random and fixed effects. As noted by Roodman (2006),
there are several advantages associated with system GMM, especially when
the researcher is faced with the following issues: (i) small T, large N pan-
els; (ii) a linear functional relationship; (iii) a single left-hand side variable
that is dynamic; (iv) independent variables that are not strictly exogenous;
(v) fixed individual (country) effects; (vi) heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation within individuals but not across them (Arellano and Bover, 1995;
Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002). However, this is not to say that the
GMM estimates are perfect and they don’t come without potential pitfalls.
Indeed, as evidenced by Bazzi and Clemens (2013), there are some poten-
tial problems when employing usage of instruments in a standard system-
GMM setting. As the authors show, a plausibly valid instrument used in
one setting could be proven to be an invalid instrument used in an addi-
tional setting. Moreover, the authors show that the unacknowledged weak
instruments may generate spurious finding in applications such as the sys-
tem GMM. Similar findings stem from research by Roodman (2008) who dis-
cusses the problems of too many instruments (i.e. when the number of in-
struments exceeds the number of groups in the GMM estimates). Hence, he
cautions that the issue of a large number of instruments could result in not
expunging the endogenous effect of the right-hand side variables. Against
this background, the authors suggest a few ways forward when tackling the
instrumentation problem in system-GMM: (i) generalization of the theoret-
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Table 3: OLS Regression Results - (Transformed Gini Dependent Variable)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Model 7 - 
excluding the 
transition 
countries
Model 8 - 
exlcuding 
developed 
countries
Polity IV  -.003 (011)  -.027* (.014)  -.022 (.021)  -.025 (.016)
Polity IV squared .005** (.002) 0.002 (0.001) .005* (.002)
Freedom House  .015 (.056)
Electoral democracy  .073 (.182)
Transformed Polity IV .0005 (.013)  .041 (.090)
Transformed Polity IV squared  -.001 (.003)
Natural resources .019*** (.006) .019*** (.005) .020*** (.005) .020*** (.005) .020*** (.006) .020*** (.005) .017*** (.006) .020*** (.007)
Log of initial GDP per capita 2.213* (1.132) 4.138*** (.997) 2.813** (1.043) 2.71** (1.077) 2.841** (1.101) 2.345 (1.568) 2.941*** (.951) 3.443** (1.347)
Log of initial GDP per capita (squared)  -.140** (.068)  -.258*** (.062)  -.179*** (.062)  -.173** (.062)  -.182** (.065)  -.163* (.091)  -.184*** (.055)  -.217** (.083)
Industry value added  -.019** (.007)  -.023** (.007)  -.021*** (.007)  -.023*** (.007)  -.021*** (.007)  -.021*** (.007)  -.008 (.007)  -.021** (.010)
Credit to the private sector .0003 (.001) .001 (.001) .0001 (.001) .0008 (.001) .0003 (.001) .0003 (.001)  -.002 (.002) .0002 (.003)
Trade Openness  -.0003 (.001)  -.0013 (.001)  -.0004 (.001)  -.001 (.001)  -.0003 (.001)  -.0003 (.001)  .001 (.001)  -.0002 (.002)
Government expenditure  -.021 (.011)  -.010 (.012)  -.013 (.011)  -.012 (.011)  -.012 (.012)  -.012 (.012)  -.014 (.013)  .002 (.017)
Constant   -7.976* (4.746)  -15.699*** (4.343)  -10.078* (4.449)  -9.807** (4.615)  -10.354* (4.709)   -9.264 (6.188)  -11.321** (4.041)  -12.899 (5.589)
Number of observations 71 71 75 75 71 71 51 49
R squared 0.6276 0.6725 0.631 0.6315 0.6258 0.6261 0.7379 0.5452
All models estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). *** denotes signficance at 1 percent level of signficance, ** denotes significance at 5 percent level of significance, * denotes significance at 10 percent level of 
signficance. All models estimated with robust standard errors (reported in parantheses).
ical underpinnings of an instrument to account for other published results
with the same instruments; (ii) deploy the latest tool for probing the validity
of the instruments; and (iii) open the GMM black box (and use the available
diagnostic tests) in order to test for the validity of the instruments.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Long-Term Relationship from Cross-Sectional Samples
To test the long-term relationship between democracy and inequality, we
regress the transformed Gini variable on the measures of democracy (Polity
IV) and control variables. The results obtained while using OLS are pre-
sented in Table 3. There are several empirical regularities that emerge from
the table. First, we do find some evidence (albeit at 10 percent level of sig-
nificance) for the existence of a non-linear relationship between democracy
and inequality. We do not, however, find evidence for a simple linear rela-
tionship between the two variables, regardless of the measure of democracy
that is used in the analysis. The results are consistent whenever we drop
the transition countries from the sample, or when we drop the developed
countries from the sample (Models 7 and 8). Vis-a´-vis the control variables,
the results support the established empirical knowledge. Across all of the
models, we find strong and robust evidence that the abundance of natural
resources is associated with higher inequality. In addition, we do find some
(albeit weak) evidence for the existence of the Kuznets curve. Moreover,
according to our estimates, the turning point of the Kuznets curve occurs
at a GDP per capita roughly equal to 3,251 USD. Finally, we do find some
evidence that government spending is associated with lower inequality.
Given the bias in the OLS results when some of the regressors are en-
dogenous, we resort to using instrumental variable (IV) approach in order
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Table 4: IV Regression Results - (Transformed Gini Dependent Variable)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Model 7 - 
excluding the 
transition 
countries
Model 8 - 
exlcuding 
developed 
countries
Polity IV  .073 (.080)  -.051 (.135) .062(.274)  .255(.451)
Polity IV squared .015 (.015)  -.028 (.053)  -.002 (.031)
Freedom House  -.210 (.137)
Electoral democracy  1.222 (1.101)
Transformed Polity IV .063 (.043)  .649 (.422)
Transformed Polity IV squared  -.021 (.015)
Natural resources .028** (.012) .021* (.011) .027*** (.007) .035** (.014) .028*** (.009) .037** (.015) .009 (.014) .034** (.017)
Log of initial GDP per capita 3.206** (1.33) 7.354* (4.244) 3.142*** (1.160) 1.61 (1.54) 2.73** (1.14)  -2.310 (4.202) 2.842** (.940)  2.62 (2.41)
Log of initial GDP per capita (squared)  -.217*** (.080)  -.455* (.248)  -.210** (.070)  -.119 (.084)  -.186** (.067)  .109 (.247)  -.169** (.064)  -.185 (.140)
Industry value added  -.023*** (.0006)  -.031** (.011)  -.019** (.007)  -.022** (.008)  -.021*** (.007)  -.013 (.013)  -.0004 (.012)  -.029*** (.009)
Credit to the private sector .002 (.002) .002 (.002)  .0003 (.002)  -.0002 (.002)  .0009 (.002)  .002 (.002)  -.001 (.003) .005 (.005)
Trade Openness   -.0006 (.002)   -.004 (.003)  - .001 (.001)   -.0008 (.001)   -.001 (.002)   .001 (.002)   -.0003 (.003)   -.0004 (.005)
Government expenditure  -.032 (.031)  -.013 (.023)  -.018* (.010)  -.007 (.015)  -.023 (.015)  -.024 (.023)  .02 (.030)  -.026 (.049)
Constant   -10.777 (5.851)   -28.661 (17.975)  -10.058** (4.77)   -5.507 (6.412)   -9.878 (4.806)   7.420 (15.024)  -11.683** (3.716)   -8.244 (10.607)
Number of observations 71 71 75 75 71 71 51 49
R squared 0.2404 0.476 0.5579 0.3911 0.4693 0.4011 0.586 0.6797
Hansen's J-test (significance level) 0.572 0.305 0.161 0.164 0.205 0.231 0.1067 0.1843
All models estimated with two-step instrumental variable approach. Dummy variables capturing legal origin/colonial past are used as instruments for democracy. *** denotes signficance at 1 percent level of signficance, 
** denotes significance at 5 percent level of significance, * denotes significance at 10 percent level of signficance. All models estimated with robust standard errors (reported in parantheses). Hansen J's test null 
hypotesis stipulates that the instruments are not correlated with the error term.
to estimate the long-run impact of democracy upon inequality. The results
are presented in the Table 4. The models are analogous to the ones used
in the OLS estimates. As mentioned previously, we use colonial/legal ori-
gins as instruments for democracy and their validity is confirmed by the
Hansen J test. The results obtained from this analysis confirm our previous
findings - that the link between democracy and inequality is elusive. As
in the previous models, here as well, we do not find evidence for the sim-
ple linear negative nor for the inverted U curve relationship between the
two variables. Even when using different proxy variables for democracy
and even when restricting the size of the sample to include only the de-
veloping and developed countries and developing and transition countries,
respectively, the results are not affected . The control variables confirm the
theoretical predictions, i.e. we find overwhelming evidence that natural re-
source abundance is associated with higher inequality. Also, we find some
evidence for the existence of the Kuznets curve and some scant evidence
that higher government consumption is associated with lower inequality.
Our results stand in quite contrast to Chong (2004), who finds a non-linear
relationship between the two variables. However his results could be criti-
cized on a few of grounds. Most importantly, while in his analysis he uses
data from early 1960s until mid 1990s in order to argue for the existence of
an inverted U curve relationship, most of the democratizations in present-
day mature democracies included in his dataset occurred in the mid-19th
century.
5.2 Short and Medium Term Impact of Democracy Upon In-
equality
In addition to providing a useful robustness test, using panel data anal-
ysis might also provide better information on the short- and medium-term
relationship between democracy and inequality. Initially, we treat democ-
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racy as an exogenous variable and only provide an OLS (random effects)
and fixed effects estimation. Table 5 gives the basic results in estimating
the impact of democracy upon inequality. We use Polity IV as a measure
of democracy across all of the models. There are a few results that emerge
from the analysis. First, the autoregressive term is positive and highly sig-
nificant, suggesting that there is a strong persistence effect of inequality.
Democracy although positive is statistically not significant from zero. Fur-
thermore, we find some evidence for the existence of the Kuznets curve and
also some positive and significant association between financial sector de-
velopment and inequality. We also find evidence that natural resources are
associated with higher inequality, while government spending is associated
with lower inequality. Similar results could be observed when fixed effects
are used . The results from using system GMM are included in the last three
columns in Table 5. We use lags of the independent variables as instruments
for themselves and in addition, we couple the usage of the standard instru-
ments for democracy with dummies for legal origin . There are a few inter-
esting results that emerge from our GMM analysis. First, the autoregressive
term is positive and significant. Its value lies between the autoregressive
terms obtained by fixed effects (which provides the lower bound) and OLS
(which provides the upper bound) for the autoregressive term obtained by
GMM estimates. Likewise, we find some strong and robust evidence for the
existence of the Kuznets curve (as in the previous models). Finally, as in
the previous models we find that financial sector development is associated
with higher inequality, while the government spending is associated with
lower inequality. So far, we have concentrated on determining which vari-
ables are significant and whether they fit the theoretical predictions, with-
out mentioning anything about the size of the coefficients. The coefficients’
sizes, however, cannot be interpreted linearly because the dependent vari-
able is a non-linear transformation of the Gini. To assess the size of the
coefficients, we first compute the baseline Gini by setting all variables in
model 1 of Table 5 to their respective means. In order to assess the impact
of the natural resources in income inequality, for instance, we raise the nat-
ural resource wealth variable by one standard deviation and we compute
the Gini coefficient again. The results suggest that an increase in the abun-
dance of natural resources by one standard deviation, is associated with an
increase in the Gini by 0.679 points in the shorter run. Table 5 provides two
additional specifications, whose results do not significantly change. Model
4 uses our basic model but it is conducted on a smaller sample that excludes
the transition countries. When the transition countries are excluded, the
results hold broadly, while the control variables behave in the usual way.
Finally, Model 5 excludes the developed countries - the premise here is that
since we start our analysis from mid 1960 and given that democracy has
been established in the developed countries already, the effect of democ-
racy through the redistributive channel would have happened already. The
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Table 5: GMM Regression Results - (Transformed Gini Dependent Variable)
Variable Model 1 OLS Model 2 FE Model 3 GMM
Model 4 GMM 
(excluding 
transition 
countries)
Model 5 GMM 
(excluding 
developed 
countries)
Lgini (lagged) .692*** (.056) .130 (.921) .458*** (.131) .342** (.139) .517*** (.124)
Polity IV .002 (.003)  -.004 (.005) .008 (.007) .005 (.007) .009 (.008)
Polity IV squared  -.001 (.005)  .007 (.007)  .0008 (.001)  -.002 (.09) .001 (.001)
Natural resources .003** (.001) .010* (.006) .014 (.010) .012* (.005) .015* (.008)
Log of GDP per capita 1.120** (.371) 1.67*** (.431) 1.56 (1.09) 2.37*** (.910) 3.200*** (.703)
Log of GDP per capita (squared)   -.067*** (.021)   -.086*** (.025)   -.099* (.059)   -.142*** (.051)   -.196*** (.043)
Industry value added  -.006** (.002)  -.014** (.005)  -.013 (.008)  -.017*** (.005)  -.001 (.011)
Credit to the private sector .001*** (.0004) .0003 (.0007) .002** (.001) .002** (.0006) .005*** (.001)
Trade Openness  -.0003 (.0003) .001 (.001)   -.0007 (.001)  .001 (.001)   .002 (.002)
Government expenditure   -.007* (.004)   .002 (.009)   -.021 (.015)   -.021** (.010)   -.021 (.016)
Constant  -4.446*** (1.612)  -8.557*** (1.828)  -5.783*** (5.325)  -9.095*** (4.058)  -13.36*** (3.077)
Number of observations 151 151 151 119 68
Number of groups 54 54 54 36 33
Number of instruments 29 29 28
Hansen test 0.157 0.271 0.149
AR(1) 0.079 0.243 0.067
AR(2) 0.542 0.722 0.501
R squared 0.9142 0.065
Uneridentification test (Kleibergen Paap rk LM statistic; p value) 0.009 0.0015 0.0028
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 12.918 44.03 6.513
Critical value (r = 0.15) for the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 8.180 8.18 4.58
Critical value (r = 0.25) for the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 5.450 5.45 3.63Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 3.922 28.8 1 3.861
All models estimated with system GMM. Lagged values of the endogenous dependent variables are used as instruments for themselves. In addition, dummy variables denoting legal origin/colonial 
past are used as instruments for the democracy variable. The specifications include the usage of two lags. The same set of instruments are used in the levels as well as the differences equations. 
The standard two-step procedure is used. The sign, magnitude and the significance of the control variables correspond to the ones used in the empirical literature. *** denotes significance at 1 
percent level of significance, ** denotes significance at 5 percent level of significance, * denotes significance at 10 percent level of signficance. All models estimated with robust standard errors 
(reported in parantheses).
results obtained by Model 5 are not much different than the ones obtained
with the analyses before.
Table 6 introduces some robustness checks where we explore additional
hypotheses on the relationship between the two variables. Hence, Model
1 tests the inverted U curve relationship between the two variables, how-
ever finds no statistically significant impact of democracy upon levels of
inequality. Model 2 introduces an alternative measure of democracy - Free-
dom House, while Model 3 introduces a similar though narrower measure
of democracy based on electoral participation. Given that Polity IV is a vari-
able ranging from -10 to 10, squaring it will complicate the results as it will
be impossible to decipher the impact of democracy upon inequality from
the impact of autocracy on inequality. Hence, we transform the variable (by
adding 10 to the original data) and Model 4 runs the inverted U curve re-
lationship hypothesis on this newly created variable. The results obtained
from these additional estimations do not impact upon the overall conclusion
that the link between democracy and inequality is elusive.
6 Discussions
There are a few reasons why the impact of democracy on inequality
may be mute. The first reason is the various and often opposing channels
through which democracy may impact upon inequality. The net effect of
these transmission mechanisms may well at the end be neutral. Studies that
use objective measures of democracy (that is attributes not performance)
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Table 6: GMM Regression Results - (Transformed Gini Dependent Variable)
Variable Model 1 - GMM Model 2 - GMM Model 3 - GMM Model 4 - GMM
Lgini (lagged) .458*** (.156) .392*** (.152) .427*** (.116) .459*** (.128)
Polity IV .008 (.007)
Polity IV squared .0008 (.001)
Freedom House .035 (.083)
Electoral democracy .115 (.166)
Lag value of Electoral democracy
Transformed Polity IV  -.005 (.022)
Transformed Polity IV squared .007 (.001)
Natural resources .014 (.010) .031** (.016) .015* (.008) .016* (.009)
Log of GDP per capita 1.567 (1.096) 2.269** (.913)   -.301 (1.241) 1.723** (.842)
Log of GDP per capita (squared)   -.099* (.059)   -.136** (.051) .0000 (1.000)   -.107** (.045)
Industry value added  -.013 (.008)  -.017 (.014)  -.012 (.010)  -.012 (.008)
Credit to the private sector .002** (.001) .004* (.002) .002** (.001) .003** (.001)
Trade Openness  -.0007 (.001)   .0008 (.001)  -.0008 (.001)  -.00105 (.001)
Government expenditure   -.021 (.015)   -.018 (.017)   -.018 (.013)   -.020 (.015)
Constant  -5.783 (5.325)  -9.346** (4.283)   2.881 (5.876)  -6.554 (4.104)
Number of observations 151 153 137 151
Number of groups 54 55 54 54
Number of instruments 29 26 26 29
Hansen test 0.157 0.065 0.03 0.142
AR(1) 0.079 0.226 0.105 0.078
AR(2) 0.542 0.562 0.097 0.548
Uneridentification test (Kleibergen Paap rk LM statistic; p value) 0.009 0.0000 0.0179 0.003
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 12.918 55.525 41.475 77.098
Critical value (r = 0.15) for the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 8.180 12.83 12.83 8.18
Critical value (r = 0.25) for the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 5.450 7.8 7.8 5.45
All models estimated with system GMM. Lagged values of the endogenous dependent variables are used as instruments for themselves. In addition, dummy variables 
denoting legal origin/colonial past are used as instruments for the democracy variable. Two lags of the endogenous variables are used in the model specifications. The 
specifications include the same set of instruments in the level and the difference equations. The models rests on employing the standard two-step GMM estimator. The sign, 
magnitude and the significance of the control variables correspond to the ones used in the empirical literature. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level of significance, ** 
denotes significance at 5 percent level of significance, * denotes significance at 10 percent level of signficance. All models estimated with robust standard errors (reported in 
parantheses).
tend to find inconclusive results because democracy, acting through various
channels, may have both negative and positive implications for inequal-
ity. The inconclusive results could also be attributed to the nature of the
institutional variables. Aron (2000), for example, states that many of the
institutional variables are ordinal indexes and as such they simply award
a country with a rank position, without specifying the difference between
countries. This shortcoming has been addressed by Barro (1996) who trans-
formed the ordinal indices into a cardinal index (which is the index where
the degree of difference matters). According to him, there is no reason to
pre-suppose that the transformation from an ordinal to a cardinal index
should be one-for-one: for instance, the difference in the quality of the ju-
diciary in the US and South Africa may be much smaller than that between
South Africa and Zaire, even though the same differential is measured on
an ordinal scale of 1 to 10. We do check our results by using an alterna-
tive measure for democracy (a binary one) however our results appear not
to be affected. Further criticism has been addressed at the often-arbitrary
aggregation of different components of some of the indices. Typically, com-
ponents are simply added or averaged with the same weights. When there
are many components, factor analysis – a technique that aggregates com-
ponents with unknown weights – is a convenient and superior alternative.
However, even this kind of analysis has not yielded robust evidence in the
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 16
Nikoloski: Democracy and Income Inequality
democracy-growth research efforts (Aron, 2000). The inconclusiveness of
results may also be caused by the way the current democracy indices are
measured. The current practice consists of using indices of democracy and
autocracy on a 10 point scale, or just a binary one, based on procedures and
laws. Explicitly avoiding any outcome dimensions such as “accountability”,
“responsiveness”, “representation” , “equality”, or “civil rights”, or any so-
cial and economic sources of political privilege has kept this narrow pro-
cedural definition innocent of letting economic success define democracy.
The resulting analysis soundly shows that this narrow definition truly has
little or no effect on economic variables, within the confines of the chosen
models or datasets. Hence, Lindert (2002) suggests that what is needed is a
more comprehensive definition that would include measures of equality of
political voice in practice, and of its time-path over many decades or cen-
turies. He also points out to the need of accounting the number of people
who really have a voice in any regime. A more holistic and comprehensive
approach in measuring democracy is therefore needed. Our study shows
that natural resource abundance is one of the principal determinants of in-
equality. The production of and the overall reliance on natural resources
has the capacity to create rents that are easily captured by the ruling elite,
which in turn results in exacerbation of the income gap between the rul-
ing minority and the poor majority (Stevens, 2003; Auty, 1994; Sarraf and
Jiwanj, 2001; McKay et al. 2003). Here we posit that there are several chan-
nels through which natural resources influence inequality. First and fore-
most, the reliance on natural resources creates rents that are easily captured
by the ruling elites, which in turn exacerbates the income gap between the
higher and the lower classes. The notion that natural resources are prone to
rent creation is confirmed by Auty (1994). He argues that rent-seeking states
have diverted their efforts into capturing more immediate gains from rent
extraction and distribution and have neglected the long-term benefits from
competitive investment in wealth creation. Similarly, Boix and Garicano
(2001) argue that initial dependence on plantation and natural resources
is associated with higher inequality and less diffused distribution of cap-
ital. Moreover, in countries that depend on natural resources, the ruling
class (landowners, owners of mines and plantations) will oppose taxation
and redistribution, which in turn would have an indirect effect on increas-
ing inequality. Land is immobile and visible and so much easier to tax, so
the landowners will avoid taxation as much as they can (Easterly, 2007). It
thus comes as no surprise that in the poorer agrarian countries there are
fewer taxes that are collected and thus fewer funds available for redistribu-
tion (Di John, 2006). Ali (2004) also confirms this notion of opposition that
the rich land-owning elites had had in the post-colonial history of Pakistan.
Second, the reliance of natural resources retards the emergence of manufac-
turing and industrialization and hence, has an indirect effect on increasing
the level of inequality. As pointed by Leamer et al. (1999), manufacturing
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promotes equality by raising wages for unskilled workers and by increas-
ing the demand for human capital which, by its nature, is more broadly
owned than land or physical capital. A shift towards manufacturing and
services also promotes educational development (as capital needs skilled
workers to operate it) (Inglehart, 1997). Increases in education attainment
might in turn decrease inequality (Birdsall, 1998). It has also been argued
that some states that rely on natural resources will oppose industrialization
because it means that alternative sources of power would desire to tax-away
the rents from oil and commodities (Isham et al., 2005). Finally, the reliance
on natural resources impedes the creation of effective and efficient institu-
tions that would put more stringent constraints on the possibilities of rent
expropriation and would also redistribute more towards the disadvantaged
parts of society. As indicated by Fors and Olsson (2007), if a country is
more abundant with natural resources, then the elites have less pressure to
install institutions that would put constraints on the possibility to extract
rents, thus leading to higher inequality. In that respect, some countries lack-
ing the institutional and technological sophistication to shift their produc-
tion towards the secondary and the tertiary sectors remain at or close to the
equilibrium of high inequality and low democracy (for example Russia and
Mexico which are discussed at length in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).
7 Conclusion
In this paper we analysed and empirically tested the relationship be-
tween inequality and democracy in short, medium and long run. While
using a variety of appropriate econometric techniques and a plethora of in-
stitutional measures that capture what we could call a democracy, we do
not find evidence that democracy is associated with lower inequality. What
we do find, however, is that some of the purely economic determinants of
inequality i.e. natural resources, the sector composition of the economy
are the ones that carry more weight as determinants of income inequal-
ity. There are a few relevant policy conclusions that could be drawn from
our study. First and foremost, when addressing income inequality, heav-
ier accent should be put on policy measures that influence the economic
determinants of inequality. In that respect, promoting measures for labour-
based economic growth and diversifying the production process could have
a tremendous effect on decreasing inequality in the long run. Moreover,
these measures of economic growth would spur growth of the GDP per
capita, which, as established in our paper is associated with lower levels of
inequality in the longer run. What remains important as a next step forward
is to consider improving the institutional measures by addressing some of
the issues above would render some of the current analysis more credible.
Creating a more credible democracy index which would be based on a more
holistic definition of democracy could be a reasonable way forward.
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8 Annex 1: Instruments for Democracy
One of the most difficult tasks in empirical research in the social sci-
ences is to diminish the erroneous effect of having an endogenous variable.
One way of achieving this is by finding good instruments (variables that
are highly correlated with the endogenous variable being instrumented but
are uncorrelated with the error term). The dangers of having democracy as
an endogenous variable have been emphasized numerous times and hence
researches have resorted to using methods other than simple OLS (mainly
2SLS or GMM) in order to deal with this issue. Up to date, researchers have
put forth a set of various instrumental variables when instrumenting for the
effect of democracy. One set of researchers, for instance, have focused on
the cultural dimension, arguing that certain religions are more conducive
to building democratic societies than others. A notable examples include,
inter alia, Huntington (1984), Kedourie (1992) as well as Voight (2005) and
Fish (2002). Similarly, another set of researches have focused on the divi-
sions within societies based on ethnicity, language and religion, as potential
instruments for democracy. According to this group of researchers, as these
divisions are more prevalent in the lesser developed countries, they tend to
act as obstacles in bringing about and maintaining democracy in third world
countries. Notable examples from this strand of the literature include, inter
alia, Cleague et al. (2001), Noland (2005) and Keefer (2008). Finally, a third
group of researchers argues that the strength of the state could be used as
a potentially useful instrument for democracy. According to the researchers
of this group, some autonomy of the state from the dominant classes is nec-
essary condition for democracy to be possible and meaningful. If the stat is
simply a tool of the dominant classes, democracy is unlikely to meaning-
fully take a root. Example of work conducted in this area include, inter alia,
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), as well as Djankov et al. (2003). However, it tran-
spires that most of the researchers have, in fact, used some variation of the
colonial origin/rule as an instrument for democracy. Most notable repre-
sentatives from this group include: Weiner (1987), Lipset et al. (1993), Barro
(1999) and Fish (2002). Olson (2007) also looks at the issue of colonialism,
though he argues that what matters the most is the timing of the coloniza-
tion (mercantilistvs. imperialist) rather than the nature and the type of the
colonizers. In that token, according to him, the fact that most of the former
British colonies are more democratic has to do less with the nature and more
with the timing of the colonization (i.e. most of them were colonized dur-
ing the imperial colonization period), although, it has to be noted that there
exist an overlap between the type of colonizer and the period of coloniza-
tion. In addition, Angeles (2007) uses the percentage of original European
settler population as an instrument for democracy and income inequality.
Finally, quite closely connected with the issue of colonialism is the issue of
democracy, strength of the rule of law and the type of law in the colonizers.
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Table A1: OLS Regression Results - (Transformed Gini Dependent Variable)
	
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Model 7 - 
excluding the 
transition 
countries
Model 8 - 
exlcuding 
developed 
countries
Initial transformed gini .792*** (.057) .772*** (.054) .799*** (.056) .798*** (.054) .792*** (.057) .795*** (.058) .854*** (.068) .829*** (.061)
Polity IV  -.0003 (0003)  -.007* (.004)  -.025 (.019)  -.014 (.026)
Polity IV squared .001** (.0007) 0.0007 (0.0007) .00005 (.001)
Freedom House   -.001 (.016)
Electoral democracy  .060 (.057)
Transformed Polity IV  -.0006 (.017)   -.016 (.025)
Transformed Polity IV squared  .0006 (.0009)
Natural resources .003 (.002) .003 (.002) .003 (.002) .003* (.002) .003 (.002) .002 (.002) .002 (.002) .003 (.002)
Log of initial GDP per capita .572* (.322) 1.07*** (.336) .511 (.312) .452 (.312) .573** (.320) .703* (.418) .695* (.358) .372 (.477)
Log of initial GDP per capita (squared)  -.037* (.019)  -.068*** (.020)  -.033* (.019)  -.030 (.018)  -.037* (.019)  -.045* (.025)  -.044** (.021)  -.023 (.021)
Industry value added  -.0003 (.003)  -.001 (.003)  -.001 (.003)  -.0009 (.003)  -.0003 (.0003)  -.0005 (.003)  -.0002 (.003)  -.002 (.004)
Credit to the private sector .0004 (.007) .0006 (.007) .0003 (.007) .0002 (.007) .0004 (.007) .0004 (.007)  .0008 (.0008) .0008 (.001)
Trade Openness  .0002 (.006)  -.0002 (.007)  .0003 (.004)  .0003 (.004)  .0002 (.006)  .0002 (.007)  .0007 (.0007)  .003 (.0008)
Government expenditure  -.009* (.004)  -.009* (.004)  -.010* (.004)  -.009** (.004)  -.009* (.004)  -.010* (.004)  -.010* (.004)   -.003 (.008)
Constant   -2.075 (1.279)   -4.103*** (1.335)   -1.809 (1.248)   -1.58 (1.25)   -2.077 (1.28)   -2.51 (1.61)   -2.45* (1.39)   -1.300 (1.828)
Number of observations 71 71 75 75 71 71 51 49
R squared 0.944 0.948 0.945 0.946 0.944 0.944 0.957 0.95
Table A1. OLS regression results - (transformed Gini dependent variable)
All models estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). *** denotes signficance at 1 percent level of signficance, ** denotes significance at 5 percent level of significance, * denotes significance at 10 percent level of 
signficance. All models estimated with robust standard errors (reported in parantheses).
Table A2: IV Regression Results - (Transformed Gini Dependent Variable)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Model 7 - 
excluding the 
transition 
countries
Model 8 - 
exlcuding 
developed 
countries
Initial transformed gini .793***(.063) .957***(.167) .795***(.057) .799***(.059) .786***(.061) .793***(.063) .922***(.145) .821***(.096)
Polity IV  .007 (.023)  .097 (.137) .031 (.60)  .0255(.451)
Polity IV squared  -.012 (.018)  -.002 (.007)  .002 (.003)
Freedom House  -.031 (.045)
Electoral democracy   -.064 (.354)
Transformed Polity IV .007 (.014)  .896 (2.179)
Transformed Polity IV squared  -.032 (.078)
Natural resources .004 (.003) .004 (.008) .004 (.002) .002 (.004) .004 (.003) .024 (.056) .004 (.007) .007 (.005)
Log of initial GDP per capita .606 (.382)  -3.307 (5.727) .572 (.354) .568 (.477) .577 (.352)  -6.43 (16.82)  -.28 (2.34) .719 (1.63)
Log of initial GDP per capita (squared)  -.041* (.024)  .188 (.337)  -.039* (.022)  -.036 (.026)  -.039* (.021)  -.36 (.972)  .010 (.139)  -.049 (.098)
Industry value added  -.0004 (.003)  .010 (.015)  -.00045(.003)  -.001 (.003)  -.0005 (.003)  .006 (.0017)  .001 (.010)  -.005 (.006)
Credit to the private sector .0006 (.0008) .0001 (.0001) .0002 (.0007) .0003 (.0007) .0004 (.0007) .002 (.005) .0008 (.001) .002 (.002)
Trade Openness   .004 (.0008)   .003 (.0004)   .003 (.0005)   .0002 (.0004)   .0003 (.0007)   .003 (.005)   .001 (.002)   .0001 (.001)
Government expenditure  -.012 (.08)  -.023 (.024)  -.010* (.04)  -.010* (.05)  -.011* (.005)  -.016 (.027)  -.018 (.17)  -.009 (.016)
Constant   -2.103 (1.49)   14.26 (23.89)   -1.842 (1.362)   -2.044 (1.874)   -2.07 (1.35)   21.73 (57.46)   1.73 (9.63)   -2.46 (6.73)
Number of observations 71 71 75 75 71 71 51 49
R squared 0.939 0.95 0.943 0.943 0.941 0.939 0.899 0.862
Hansen's J-test (significance level) 0.249 0.4588 0.329 0.027 0.249 0.659 0.736 0.572
All models estimated with two-step instrumental variable approach. Dummy variables capturing legal origin/colonial past are used as instruments for democracy. *** denotes signficance at 1 percent level of signficance, 
** denotes significance at 5 percent level of significance, * denotes significance at 10 percent level of signficance. All models estimated with robust standard errors (reported in parantheses). Hansen J's test null 
hypotesis stipulates that the instruments are not correlated with the error term.
La Porta et al. (2008) find a strong correlation between the common law and
institutional development (and therefore growth) in the former colonies. ule
as instrument is often coupled with using lagged values of the democracy
variable as instruments for itself. Gerrig et al. (2005), for instance, specify
a system of simultaneous equations in which democracy is estimated by
using fixed effects as well as lagged values of itself as instruments and dis-
cover that the relationship between democracy and growth is stronger when
democracy is seen as a cumulative variable.
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